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THE EVOLUTION OF ILLINOIS TORT STATUTES OF LIMITATION:
WHERE ARE WE GOING AND WHY?
Most jurisdictions restrict the time within which a tort cause of action
may be commenced.' The majority of tort statutes of limitation speak in
terms of triggering the running of their time period upon the "accrual" of
the cause of action.2 The traditional view is that the limitation period accrues
(or commences to run) when the last act necessary to establish tort liability
occurs. 3 In the usual situation, a wronged party will be aware, well before
the expiration of the limitation period, that he has been injured and has a
possible right of action.4
A problem which has come to the fore in recent years is the not
uncommon occurrence of a careful and diligent plaintiff who, at the time his
I. Statutes of limitation have been part of the law of every civilized nation from
time immemorial. Since each sovereignty may organize its judicial tribunals accord-
ing to its own notions of policy, it has been recognized since the early days of this
republic that statutes of limitation are within the sovereign power of each state to
enact.
Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 682 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). Statutes
of limitation appeared early in the Roman law and ar the basis of the limitations found in the
Continental codes. Statute of Limitations-Medical Malpractice-Viability of the Discovery
Rule as a Criterion to Determine When a Cause of Action Accrues in Medical Malpractice
Actions. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (1960), 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 206 n.2 (1973).
2. Estep & Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases,
62 MICH. L. REV. 753, 756 (1964); see Littel, Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND.
L.J. 23 (1945); 4 AM. JUR. TRIALS Statutes of Limitation § 6 (1966).
3. As a general rule actual damage is the last element to occur which gives rise to tort
liability. Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890, 894 (N.D. Ill.
1971). Normally a plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages if he proves a violation by the
defendant of a technical right. Werthemier v. Glanz, 277 Ill. App. 389, 392 (1934). But a plaintiff
is not entitled to any damages in a negligence case, even though he proves such a violation,
unless he can prove that he has sustained some actual loss or harm. Jeffrey v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 37 Ill. App. 2d 327, 336, 185 N.E.2d 384, 388-89 (1962); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1956); C. MORRIS, TORTS § I at 48 (1953); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 22, at
88 (1935); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Edwards v. Ely, 317 Il. App.
599, 47 N.E.2d 344 (1943), as "clearly out of line").
In Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
the defendant was being sued for the negligent manufacture of a helicopter sold to the plaintiff.
The court held that the last act creating liability was the crash and, consequently, the action
accrued at that time. Id. at 893. But see Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1975), where the court decided that Klondike properly stated Illinois law but improperly applied
it. The court elaborated: "We believe the correct conclusion under Illinois law should have
been that the plaintiff was injured, for purposes of this property damage action, when he took
possession of the defectively manufactured helicopter." Id. at 607 n.8.
With regard to torts which arise from contractual obligations, the statute of limitations has
been held to run at the time of the breach, not when damages ensue. Pennsylvania Co. v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 144 Ill. 197, 33 N.E. 415 (1893); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Sal E.
Lobianco & Son Co., 43 IIl. App. 3d 765, 357 N.E.2d 621 (1976); H. WOOD, LIMITATION OF
ACTIONS § 177 (1882) [hereinafter cited as WOOD].
4. Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881,
882 (1973).
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cause of action accrues, is unaware that he has suffered a legally redressable
injury and remains unaware of the injury throughout the running of the
limitation period.5 Traditionally, the running of the time period was not
tolled by the victim's ignorance concerning his cause of action. 6 Once the
time period ran the statute operated to deprive such a person of his legal
claim even before he was aware of it. 7 For all practical purposes this was a
right without a remedy.
8
A recent judicial invention created by the courts to alleviate this
problem is descriptively referred to as the "discovery rule." 9 Under the
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue and the limitation period
begin to run until the wronged party learns of his injury or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have learned of it.' 0
The Illinois judiciary has been a leader in the application of the
discovery rule to a wide variety of tort statutes of limitation. I" This leader-
ship, however, has lacked a substantive base. The Illinois Supreme Court
has been content to leave to the appellate courts the task of defining the
contours of the discovery rule and the status that the rule should assume in
Illinois. 12
5. Id.; see Petersen, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations: A
Right Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644, 645 (1970); Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation
Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 753, 758-59
(1964).
6. Lancaster v. Springer, 239 Il. 472, 481, 88 N.E. 272, 275 (1909); Board of Educ. v.
Perkins & Will Partnership, 119 111. App. 2d 196, 225 N.E.2d 496 (1970); Wilson v. White Motor
Corp., 118 Il1. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E. 2d 277 (1969); Sabath v. Morris Handler Co., 102 Ill. App.
2d 218, 243 N.E.2d 723 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Joseph J. Duffy Co., 97 Ill. App. 2d 158, 240
N.E.2d 5 (1968); Simoniz Co. v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, Inc., 81 111. App. 2d 428,225 N.E.2d
161 (1967).
7. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
8. Petersen, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations: A Right
Without a remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644, 645 (1970). The reference is to Article I, section
12 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 which provides in part: "Every person shall find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or
reputation." The argument has been raised and rejected that in such situations the statute of
limitations operates to deprive the plaintiff of a property right without due process of law. Toth
v. Lenk, - Ind. App. -, 330 N.E.2d 336 (1975) (concurring opinion). See 2 T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 760-65 (8th ed. 1927).
9. See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. One writer lists Taylor v. Rowland, 26 Tex. 293 (1862), as the first American case
suggesting the time of discovery rule. Comment, The Time of Discovery Rule and the Qualified
Privilege Defense for Credit Reporting Agencies in Illinois After World of Fashion v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 359, 372 n.47 (1977). The rule first appeared in
the medical malpractice area in Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917). The Hahn
case was later misconstrued in Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628,630 (4th Cir. 1940). Comment,
Limitations in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L. REV. 47, 61 n.102 (1%8). The
discovery rule was not considered a potent legal theory until it was adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
I1. See Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and the Statute of Limita-
tions, 64 ILL. B.J. 326 (1976).
12. In the initial cases involving the discovery rule the Illinois Supreme Court is surpris-
ingly silent with regard to any directions for the use of the rule. The court focused its decisions
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This development has taken an extremely narrow case-by-case ap-
proach and, consequently, has provided little predictability as to future
applications of the rule. The principal questions that had been left unans-
wered were whether the discovery rule would be limited to any particular
types of actions (e.g., personal injury as opposed to property damage
actions' 3 and professional malpractice as opposed to ordinary negligence
actions 4 ) or whether the discovery rule would be limited to any particular
statutes of limitation (e.g., those which run from when the cause of action
accrued in comparison to the wrongful death statute which runs from the
death of some person 15 and statutes with short limitation periods as opposed
to those with relatively long ones' 6).
The purpose of this article is to define the status of the discovery rule in
Illinois, to evaluate the approach taken by the courts in applying the
discovery rule to a particular case, and to consider the merits of the
bifurcated statute of limitation which allows a person to commence suit a
certain number of years from the time he discovered his injury but also sets
an outside limit (computed from the date of injury) beyond which no action
may be brought.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE
Historically, the only time limitation which governed the bringing of a
common law tort cause of action was the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona. 7 As long as both the plaintiff and the defendant were alive,
the cause of action could be brought and remedies obtained. 18 A prospective
solely on the facts before it. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Lipsey v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
13. "The very strong policy in favor of adjudication of claims on the merits is no weaker
in cases involving injury to real property than in cases involving personal injuries." Basque v.
Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Haw. 397, 399, 441 P.2d 636, 637 (1968).
14. In ordinary tort and contract actions, the statute of limitations, it is true,
begins to run upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.
The plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action, or of the identity of the wrongdoer,
does not toll the statute. In cases of professional malpractice, however, postpone-
ment of the period of limitations until discovery finds justification in the special
nature of the relationship between the professional man and his client.
Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187-88, 491 P.2d 421,428, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971) (footnote omitted).
15. The first case to apply the discovery rule to a non-"cause of action accrued" statute is
Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 II1. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976).
16. "A short statute provides a stronger case for a discovery rule approach than a long
one. For the probability of injustice resulting from the failure to discover meritorious claims
unquestionably diminishes as the statutory period increases." Gates Rubber Co. v. USM
Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1975).
17. "A personal right of action dies with the person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 47 (4th
ed. 1951); WOOD, supra note 3, at 2-3; 51 AM. JUR. 2d Limitation of Actions § 1 (1970). This
approach was based upon the common law rules with regard to abatement or survival of a tort
cause of action. See I AM. JUR. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival §§ 47, 61 (1970).
18. See 51 AM. JUR. 2d Limitation of Actions § 1 (1970); 1 AM. JUR 2d Abatement,
Survivial and Revival §§ 47, 61 (1970).
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defendant was capable of being subjected to suit long after evidence that
might gave been utilized in his defense had dried up or disappeared. 19
At early common law, when abuses from stale claims became unendur-
able, Parliament would simply enact a statute extinguishing all causes of
action which had arisen prior to that date. 20 This drastic method of protect-
ing defendants and the courts from stale causes of action was merely a
temporary stop-gap approach and not a cure for the problem itself. In time a
more rational solution took shape. Statutes of limitation were enacted
requiring that all prospective plaintiffs commence suit within a fixed period
of time after their cause of action arose. 21 In this way, "by one constant law
certain limitations might serve for the time present and for all times to
come. " 22
Part of the rationalization behind such time limitations rests on the
image of a prospective plaintiff, who has failed to bring his action before the
running of the limitation period, as a "sleeping claimant," that is, a person
who intentionally or negligently postpones suing another person against
whom he has a basis for a claim. 23 As one Illinois court expressed it, statutes
of limitation "favor the diligent and not the slothful."
24
Initially, the judiciary regarded such statutes with disfavor and were
reluctant to enforce them. 25 This resistance gradually abated and statutes of
19. "A defendant who does not imagine that any claim may be brought against him is not
only likely to have parted with evidence that he at one time had but is also likely to have lost
track of evidence which at one time he could have obtained." Williams, Limitation Periods on
Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881, 884 (1973).
20. Housing Auth. of Union City v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 334, 136 A.2d
401, 404 (1957). The legislature chose for that purpose certain notable dates, such as the
beginning of the reign of King Henry I, the return of King John from Ireland, the journey of
Henry III into Normandy and the coronation of King Richard I. WOOD, supra note 3, at 4.
21. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 4. The statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1540), was the first
effective statute limiting the time for the bringing of a suit upon a cause of action. It was
confined to real actions and did not apply to personal actions. See I F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1891); Wood v. Carpenter. 101 U.S. 135
(1879). This act was superseded by the Limitation of Action, and Avoidance of Suits at Law
Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, extending the limitation to personal as well as real actions. "The
Limitation Act of 1623 marks the beginning of the modern law of limitations on personal actions
in the common law." Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1178 (1950). The statute is set out in WOOD, supra note 3, at 631-33. The statutes of
limitation of the various states are all founded upon the statute of James and retain its essential
provisions. Id. at 5, 8.
22. WOOD, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Lord Coke).
23. "Statutes of limitation . . . 'are founded upon the general experience of mankind,
that claims which are valid are not usually allowed to remain neglected.'" Weber v. Board of
Harbor Comm'rs., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 70 (1873) (quoting Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1869)).
24. Phoebe v. Jay, 1 111. (Bresse) 268, 273 (1828).
25. Early cases felt it was dishonorable to invoke the statute of limitations defense. "In
honesty, he [the defendant] ought not to defend himself by such a plea." Quantocks v.
England, 98 Eng. Rep. 382, 383 (Ex. 1770). Many courts were openly hostile to the enforcement
of such statutes. Cf. Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, 643 (1868); Koop v. Cook, 67 Or. 93, 94, 135
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limitation came to be favored by the law, 26 being described as statutes of
repose 27 which suppressed "fraudulent, false, frivolous, speculative or
uncertain claim[s]. "28
Today, every state has comprehensive statutes setting forth periods of
limitation for substantially all actions which arise by virtue of either statute
or common law principles. 29 In addition, most federally created rights of
action have specific statutes of limitation.3a While the language varies, the
majority of tort statutes provide that all actions shall be brought within so
many years after the cause of action accrued.3 ' Illinois is no exception. a2
"Cause of action accrued" is simply another way of saying when a cause of
action exists.3 3 A cause of action comes int9 existence and thereby accrues
when all the elements necessary to establish tort liability occur.3 4 Genera-
tions of Illinois lawyers have learned the principle that tort statutes of
limitation run from the occurrence of the last act giving rise to a cause of
action.3
5
At common law the limitation period was tolled if the prospective
plaintiff was under a legal disability at the time his cause of action ac-
crued.36 Various disabilities came to be recognized as tolling the running of
the statute. 37 The prospective plaintiff's knowledge or awareness of his
P. 317, 318 (1913) (Early judicial hostility to statutes of limitation noted but held to have no
effect in these decisions).
26. "The statute of limitations is entitled to the same respect with other statutes, and
ought not to be explained away." Clementson v. Williams, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 72, 73 (1814). See
also Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
27. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 350, 360 (1828); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 270, 277 (1830). "The statute of limitations has been emphatically declared to be a statute
of repose .. . Beatty v. Burnes, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 98, 108 (1814).
28. New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 425, 241 A.2d 633, 636
(1968).
29. See note I supra.
30. For a general compilation of these statutes, see 4 AM. JUR. TRIALS Statutes of
Limitation § 5 (1966).
31. See note 2 supra.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 14-16 (1975).
33. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 68 (1873). "[1It has always
heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not begin
to run against a cause of action before that cause of action exists .... "Dincher v. Marlin
Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
34. See note 3 supra; Reat v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 197 N.E.2d 860
(1964).
35. See Coumoulas v. Service Gas Inc., 10 Ill. App. 3d 273, 293 N.E.2d 187 (1973).
36. Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881,
882 (1973).
37. J. ANGELL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW 201 (6th ed. 1876); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
83, § 22 (1975) (disabilities). The disability must exist at the time the statute would normally
begin to run. A disability arising after the statute has started running is of no consequence even
though the plaintiff may be completely unable to act. Berman v. Palatine Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 371
(7th Cir. 1967); Glenn v. McDavid, 316 III. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942).
When the disability existing at the time the cause of action accrues is removed and the
statute begins to run another disability will not toll the running of the limitation period. Keil v.
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cause of action, however, was considered to be irrelevant except where such
ignorance resulted from a tortfeasor's fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action.38 Under this approach, the statute might well run before the victim
even acquired knowledge of his cause of action.
The justification put forth for this view lays in the very purpose giving
rise to statutes of limitation-the protection of prospective defendants from
stale, false and fraudulent claims. 39 The courts felt that arbitrary time limits
were necessary to ensure that defendants were not confronted by stale
claims 40 which were difficult to disprove. This is because the passage of
time often results in the destruction or loss of relevant evidence and in the
unavailability of material witnesses. The statutory limitation served as an
automatic bar based on an irrebuttable presumption that any claim which
was not enforced during the statutory period was either stale or not
meritorious.
The judiciary's traditional strict interpretation of the limitation statutes
was inflexible. Under the traditional rule, the courts had to uphold the
statutory bar when confronted by a meritorious claim for which the evidence
was not yet stale and which had not been timely enforced because the party
was faultlessly ignorant of his cause of action. 41 The courts reasoned that the
hardship imposed in barring such a party's claim before he had even become
aware of its existence was merely "part of the price to be paid" in
preventing recovery on stale and nonmeritorious demands.42 The courts took
Healey, 84 Ill. 104 (1876). However, disabilities may be tacked together if they overlap. See
Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) (allowed the
disability of imprisonment to be tacked onto one of minority). If a party is under concurrent
disabilities when the claim accrues, the statute will not begin to run until the expiration of the
longer. See generally ANNOT., 53 A.L.R. 1305 (1928).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (1975). In order to toll the statute, the concealment must
have been affirmative, intended to prevent discovery of the cause of action and must in fact
prevent such discovery. Bush v. Continental Cas. Co., 116 11. App. 2d 94, 253 N.E.2d 619
(1969). In Skrodski v. Sherman State Bank, 348 Ill. 403, 181 N.E. 325 (1932), the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the fraudulent concealment answer to defendant-appellee's statute of
limitation defense. The court stated, "it could not be said . . . that acts on the part of the
appellee, though attempts to conceal a cause of action, could accomplish that purpose." Id. at
409, 181 N.E. at 328. Accord, Keithley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 271 Il1. 584, 594-95, 111 N.E.
503, 507 (1916). Concealment of the identity of the party liable is not deemed sufficient. Proctor
v. Wells Bros. Co., 181 Il1. App. 468 (1913), aff'd, 262 Ill. 77, 104 N.E. 186 (1915).
39. See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); Order of R.R.
Tel'rs. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913); Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 55 Il. 2d
121, 125, 302 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1973); Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill.
2d 273, 289-90, 122 N.E.2d 540, 549 (1954); Horn v. City of Chicago, 403 Il. 549, 560, 87 N.E.2d
642, 649 (1949); Jackson v. Navik, 17 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676, 308 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1974). See
Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and the Statute of Limitations, 64 ILL.
B.J. 326 nn.5-8 (1976).
40. "The statute of limitations was . . . enacted to protect persons . . . from ancient
claims, whether well or ill founded." Clementson v. Williams, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 72, 74(1814).
41. See note 6 supra.
42. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971); see Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133,
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solace in the fact that most parties in the exercise of ordinary care would be
put on notice of a possible claim well within the statutory period.43 The legal
postulate that every meritorious claimant should have an "opportunity" to
present his case was overshadowed."
The harshness of the traditional statute of limitation's approach has met
with a virtual storm of criticism in the medical malpractice area over the last
two decades.45 In response to this criticism, various judiciaries began to
escape the traditional rule's harsh effect by adopting "adroit doctrinal
devices. "46 Some adopted a "termination of treatment rule" holding that if
a doctor, who had been guilty of malpractice, continued to treat the patient,
the period of limitations would not begin until the termination of the
physician-patient relationship.47 A "constructive fraud" theory was utilized
in some jurisdictions whereby the physician was under a continuing duty to
disclose what he knew or should have known of a patient's condition.
67 S.W.2d 140 (1934). As the court stated in Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270
N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 827-28 (1936): "The Statute of Limitations is a statute of repose.
At times it may bar the assertion of a just claim. Then its application causes hardship. The
Legislature has found that such occasional hardship is outweighed by the advantage of outlaw-
ing stale claims."
43. See note 23 supra.
44. See Sacks, Statutes of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 65 (1967); cf. Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Haw. 397, 399, 441 P.2d 636, 637 (1968) (statute
tolled until discovery).
45.. Comment, Limitations in Professional Malpractice, 28 MD. L. REV. 47 (1968);
Petersen, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations: A Right Without a
Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644 (1970); Note, Torts- Statutes of Limitations in Medical
Malpractice Cases-Justice Sought and Almost Attained, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 234 (1971);
Statute of Limitations-Medical Malpractice-Viability of the Discovery Rule as a Criterion to
Determine When a Cause of Action Accrues In Medical Malpractice Actions. Tex. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5526, § 6 (1960), 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 206 (1973).
46. Sacks, Statute of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
65, 67 n.8 (1967). Prosser referred to these as "transparent devices to get around the rule." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
47. The first case in which the rule was applied was Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65
N.E.865 (1902). Illinois rejected the termination of treatment rule in Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319
Ill. App. 5%, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943). Cases which have applied the rule include Borgia v. City of
New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962); Pump v. Fox, 113 Ohio
App. 150, 177 N.E.2d 520 (1961). For a general discussion of this rule see 61 AM. JUR. 2d
Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers § 185 (1972) and 4 AM. JUR. TRIALS Statutes of Limita-
tion § 35 (1966). Whether or not treatment is "continuous" can prove troublesome. Fonda v.
Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1975).
The theory underlying the rule is that the very existence of the physician-patient relation-
ship encourages the patient to rely upon his physician and inhibits his ability to discover the
injury. Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 180 N.W.2d 187 (1970). This rule also encourages the
patient first to seek recourse through remedial care rather than through the courts and discour-
ages the physician from procrastinating his treatment of the patient until the statutory period
has expired.
This theory has been used with regard to attorneys who continue to represent their clients
after an act of malpractice. Berry v. Zisman, 70 Mich. App. 376, 245 N.W.2d 758 (1976); Siegel
v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1974). It has also been used with regard to
accountants, Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1973), and
architects, County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998
(1974).
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Failure to so disclose amounted to fraud and tolled the running of the
limitations period.4 8 Other jurisdictions characterized the failure to remove a
foreign object negligently left inside a patient's body as "continuing negli-
gence. " 
4 9
The aim of the judiciary was laudable but these devices amounted to
nothing more than dubious benign fictions, 50 none of which could solicit
substantial support among the states. While their last vestiges still exist
today, 5 1 these theories have been all but discarded in a trend toward the
partial or complete adoption of the discovery rule.
52
The initial justification put forth for the discovery rule's adoption and
its judicial transformation of tort statutes of limitation is that the phrase
"cause of action accrued" is capable of being defined as either the time of
discovery or the time of the commission of the tortious act.53 Since the
48. Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. 1934); Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d
503 (1934). Some states hold that constructive fraud terminates with the physician-patient
relationship and the statute of limitations runs at that time. See, e.g., Toth v. Lenk, 330 N.E.2d
336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
49. Puro v. Henry, 32 Conn. Supp. 118, 342 A.2d 65 (1975); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or.
559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942); Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10, 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966).
50. The "constructive fraud" theory, for example, is a contradiction in terms. Failure to
discover the nature and source of plaintiff's condition may be negligent, but it is hardly
fraudulent. See, e.g., Kauchick v. Williams, 435 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1968).
51. Georgia presently adheres to a continuing tort theory for foreign object cases. Parker
v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300, 183 S.E.2d 605 (1971). Minnesota applies a continuous treatment
rule. Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 291 Minn. 145, 190 N.W.2d 77 (1971); Schmit v. Esser,
183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931). Indiana intermingles a constructive fraud and termination
of treatment approach to all medical malpractice actions. Toth v. Lenk, 330 N.E.2d 336, 339
(Ind. Ct. App. 1975). The constructive fraud ends with the termination of the physician-patient
relationship. In van Bronckhorst v. Taube, 341 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) the court held
that in cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, the end of the physician-patient relation-
ship does not, as a matter of law, "commence the clock ticking on the statute of limitations,"
i.e., it does not automatically terminate the affirmative fraudulent concealment which serves to
toll the running of the statute. Id. at 796-98. Montana has codified its constructive fraud theory.
MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-2624 (Supp. 1975) (statute tolled where defendant fails to disclose
act, error or omission which is known to him or which through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been known to him).
52. Thirty-five jurisdictions now apply the time of discovery rule to at least some medical
malpractice actions. The vast majority of these apply the rule to all such actions. See note 58
infra.
53. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 207, 421 P.2d 996 (1966).
The typical approach is to refer to the dictionary definition of the word accrue; when used with
reference to a cause of action it means "when a suit may be maintained thereon . . . . [It
accrues] whenever one person may sue another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (4th ed. 1951)
(emphasis added). The court then focused on the word may as referring to the ability of the
plaintiff to bring his claim. It concluded from this that a cause of action does not accrue until the
plaintiff has knowledge of it for it is only at this time that he acquires the ability to maintain an
action on his claim. Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966).
The underlying defect in this approach is that the word may as it is used in the definition of
accrue does not refer to the ability of the plaintiff to enforce his claim; rather, it refers to when
a defendant becomes subject to tort liability. "When an action may be maintained thereon" is
simply another way of saying "when all the elements of tort liability have occurred." See Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Van Dusen dealt with the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
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legislatures have left the matter undetermined, the courts are free to adopt
the time of discovery definition. 54 Under this theory the discovery rule is
confined to "cause of action accrued" statutes.
In fact what the courts adopting the discovery rule have done is not to
redefine the phrase "cause of action accrued" but simply to imply the
existence of knowledge as a statutory requirement for triggering the running
of the limitation period.55 While a person's claim may accrue (that is, come
into existence) without his knowledge, the limitation period should not
begin to run until he becomes aware of it. The courts recognize that any
limitation statute should not be triggered by reference to whether the plain-
tiff had any technical legal right, but by the existence of a practical reme-
dy. 56 When viewed in this light, the discovery rule's application is not
arbitrarily limited to "cause of action accrued" statutes.
57
The discovery rule has come to dominate tort statutes of lifnitation
1404(a) (1970), which provided in part: "[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." The Court held the phrase "might
have been brought" referred to the suability of the defendant and not to the ability of the
plaintiff to bring suit.
In Bernard v. Boulware, 5 Mo. 454, 456 (1838), the court properly recognized that the
accrual of a cause of action is in no way dependent upon the plaintiff's awareness that he in fact
has a claim. The court stated:
It is an abuse of language to pretend that the cause of action did not accrue till [sic]
the plaintiffs were informed that words had been spoken . . . . [lI]t does not seem
probable that the law-making power should intend to strain language so far as to
intend that the time when the right of action accrued, was the time when the plaintiff
might come to the knowledge of the speaking of slanderous words.
54. See cases cited in note 53 supra.
55. See Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976).
56. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205
(1950). It is this view to which the often cited text of Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 312, 421
P.2d 996, 998 is directed: "To say to one who has been wronged, 'You had a remedy, but before
the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,' makes a mockery of
the law." Accord, Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d 372, 375-76 (1944). Branner
refused to ascribe to the legislature any such intention absent an expressed statutory direction.
Some courts have felt that to imply a discovery requirement in the limitation statutes would
in effect render the fraudulent concealment exception (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (1975))
superfluous. See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1975); Parmelee
v. Price, 105 II1. App. 271 (1902), aff'd, 208 I11. 544, 70 N.E. 725 (1904). These courts therefore
conclude that the legislature did not intend full implementation of the discovery rule. This
reasoning, however, is erroneous. A general application of the discovery rule, at least as it
exists in Illinois, does not render the fraudulent concealment exception redundant.
The general rule is that a tort statute of limitation runs from the time of the injury or
damage. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. All plaintiffs who are faultlessly ignorant of
their cause of action, whether their ignorance is caused by defendant's fraudulent concealment
or otherwise, may invoke the discovery rule if the plaintiff's interest in being given an
opportunity to present his cause of action outweighs the difficulty of proof created by the
passage of time. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra. In short, the invocation of the
discovery rule is a qualified right.
If the plaintiff is not permitted to invoke the discovery rule but can establish that the
defendant fraudulently concealed the cause of action, the plaintiff has an absolute right to turn
to the fraudulent concealment statute. This is justified by the defendant's misconduct.
57. See note 15 supra.
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which govern' medical malpractice actions. 58 Recent years have witnessed
the expansion of this reformation beyond the confines of medical malprac-
tice to other areas of tort law.
59
58. The judiciary in thirteen jurisdictions have interpreted their individual tort statutes of
limitation to be of the discovery rule type for all cases of medical malpractice. DEL. CODE tit.
10, § 8119 (1974), see Oakes v. Gilday, 351 A.2d 85 (1976); D.C. CODE § 12-301 (1966), Jones v.
Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 1907 Haw. Sess. Laws c. 113 § I
(current version at HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1968)), Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 150, 433
P.2d 220 (1967); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3536 (West 1977), Duhon v. Saloom, 323 So. 2d 202
(La. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 325 So. 2d 794 (La. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 1 (1972), Jones v.
Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1975), Acker v.
Sorenson, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:14-2 (1952), Duffy v.
Ackerhalt, 138 N.J. Super. 119, 350 A.2d 283 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Cum.
Supp. 1976-1977), Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying Oklahoma law); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (Purdon 1953), Huber v. McElwee-Courbis Constr. Co., 392 F. Supp.
1379 (E.D. Pa. 1974), Ragan v. Steen, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 331 A.2d 724 (1974); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-14 (1969) (amended 1976), Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745
(1968); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (6)-(7) (Vernon 1958), Sanchez v. Wade, 514
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); W.
VA. CODE § 55-2-12(b) (1966), Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-19 (1957), cf. Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970) (engineer
negligence).
In two other states the judiciaries have limited their discovery construction in medical
malpractice cases to those where foreign objects are left in the body: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
508:4 (Supp. 1975), Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974),
Patrick v. Morin, 115 N.H. 513, 345 A.2d 389 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page
Supp. 1977), Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972). Ohio has
rejected the opportunity to extend the rule to other cases of malpractice. Simmons v. Riverside
Methodist Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 146, 336 N.E.2d 460 (1975). However, it does apply a
termination of treatment rule to non-foreign object cases. Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St. 2d
319, 285 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
In eighteen other states the legislature has stepped in and enacted a discovery rule statute
of limitation for medical malpractice cases. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1960) as amended (1)(2)
(Supp. 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-564 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5
(Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(4)(b) (West Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE §
614.1(9) (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 60-513(4), (7)(c) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413-140(1)(e), (2)
(Supp. 1976); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-2624 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-52(5), -15(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-14-4 (Interim Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512(4) (Supp. 1976) (all personal injury
actions); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350 (1975). Idaho has limited its discovery statute of
limitation to foreign object cases. IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (Supp. 1976).
New York has a unique statute. It provides a two and one-half year statute of limitation
which runs from the "act or omission complained of .... ." It contains, where applicable, a
"continuous treatment tolling" provision. Also, a discovery rule approach is utilized with
regard to foreign object cases. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214-d (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976-
1977).
59. Four jurisdictions now apply a general discovery rule approach for all professional
malpractice: Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.1 l(4)(a) (West Supp. 1977); Leonhart v. Atkinson,
265 Md. 219, 289 A.2d 1 (1972); Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 103 n.l, 305 A.2d 219, 222 n.1
(1973); Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970).
Aside from these four jurisdictions the primary activity of the rule has been with regard to
attorney malpractice. See note 1 l infra.
There have been only a smattering of cases involving professionals other than attorneys.
See, e.g., architects: Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967); insurance
agents: Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wash. 2d 215, 543 P.2d 338 (1975); land surveyors:
Kundahl v. Barnett, 5 Wash. App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971). See the cases cited in Gates
Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 610 n.16 (7th Cir. 1975)..
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COMMON LAW EVOLUTION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN ILLINOIS
The traditional rule, that the running of the limitation period is not
tolled by the person's ignorance of his cause of action, was first departed
from by the Illinois Supreme Court in Madison v. Weldron Silica Co. 60 In
that case the plaintiff worked for the defendant from 1924 until 1930, during
which time he contracted silicosis. The plaintiff filed suit against the
company in 1931 based on violations of the Workmen's Occupational
Diseases Act. 61 This act was governed at the time by section 15 of the
Limitations Act 62 which provided in part: "Actions for damages for an
injury to the person . . .shall be commenced within two years next after
the cause of action accrued." The defendant raised this statute as a defense,
arguing that the cause of action accrued upon the first inhalation of silica
dust and the mere fact the full extent of plaintiff's injuries had not yet
occurred did not postpone the accrual of the cause of action. 63 The court
rejected the argument when it stated: "[t]he logical view is to consider the
time when the employee is forced to quit work because of the cumulative
effect of successive injuries resulting in final disablement rather than the
Applications of the time of discovery rule to personal injury or property damage actions
not within the professional malpractice sphere are rare. Two jurisdictions have enacted general
discovery statutes of limitation for all personal injury actions. KAN. STAT. § 60-513(4) (Supp.
1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512(4) (Supp. 1976).
North Carolina has enacted a discovery rule statute of limitations for both personal injury
and property damage actions. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-52, -15 (Supp. 1975). The Pennsylva-
nia judiciary has interpreted its personal injury tort statute to be of the discovery rule type for
all personal injury actions. Huber v. McElwee-Courbis Constr. Co., 329 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Ragan v. Steen, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 331 A.2d 724 (1974). The Hawaiian judiciary
has applied the discovery rule to property damage actions. Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Haw.
397, 441 P.2d 636 (1968). The Illinois judiciary has applied the time of discovery rule to personal
injury and property damage actions not within the professional malpractice area. See Auster v.
Keck, 31 Il. App. 3d 61, 63-66, 333 N.E.2d 65, 65-69 (1975) (chronological discussion of the
discovery rule's use in Illinois).
60. 352 Il. 60, 184 N.E. 901 (1933). There is an earlier subterranean coal case which at
first blush seemed to create an exception to the traditional rule. Treece v. Southern Gem Coal
Corp., 245 Il. App. 113 (1923). In Treece the defendant had negligently removed coal from
under the real estate of the surface owner by failing to provide subterranean support. Eventual-
ly the surface began to sink. The court held the statute of limitations began to run when the
subsidences of the surface occurred and not when the coal was negligently removed. The
court's holding in Treece was based not upon an exception to the traditional rule but upon the
precept that when an act is not legally injurious until certain consequences occur, the time
commences to run from the consequential damage, even though the alleged negligent act
occurred years earlier. See note 3 supra. This is not to say that before the land began to subside
a private nuisance action would not have been appropriate.
There were a number of earlier Illinois cases which refused to deviate from the traditional
statute of limitations approach. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Springer, 239 III. 472, 481, 88 N.E. 272,
275 (1909); Parmelee v. Price, 105 Il. App. 271 (1902), aff'd, 208 II1. 544, 70 N.E. 725 (1904);
Calumet Elec. St. Ry. v. Mabie, 66 111. App. 235 (1896); Carr v. Bennett, 21111. App. 137 (1886).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 173, 185 (1931).
62. Id. ch. 83, § 15 (1931).
63. See Reat v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 271-72, 197 N.E.2d 860, 863
(1964).
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first inhalation or injury. "I It determined this was the more liberal and
humane view and one which accomplished the purpose of the Workmen's
Occupational Diseases Act.
65
The Madison court did not technically adopt the discovery rule. For all
practical purposes, however, it ensured that the limitation period would not
begin to run against an employee, whose illness or disease manifested itself
long after exposure to chemicals or dust, until he had discovered his injury.
The legislature accepted the logic espoused by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Madison when in 1937 it amended the Workmen's Occupational
Diseases Act to include a statute of limitation which began to run upon
disablement. 66 The Madison court's influence in bringing about this amend-
ment was to be ignored in Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital ,67 an important
case regarding the discovery rule.
In Mosby, a surgical needle was left inside the plaintiff's body during
the course of an operation in 1956. In 1960, a subsequent operation dis-
closed the needle and the permanent damage it had caused. The complaint
filed in 1962 was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was
barred, having been brought more than two years after the cause of action
accrued.68 An Illinois appellate court, although recognizing that the trend of
authority in other states was in favor of the discovery rule, 69 affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
After taking notice of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act 7° and
Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act (both of which had time periods
which commenced running on discovery of injury or illness), the court held
that the legislature's failure to extend the same rule to the medical malprac-
tice statute of limitation (section 15) was deliberate. It concluded that it
could not "do what the legislature ha[d] failed to do."-
7 1
The reasoning of the Mosby court is difficult to comprehend. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Madison had done exactly what the Mosby
appellate court felt constrained to do, interpret section 15 of the Limitations
Act as running from the time the injury became manifest. The subsequent
enactment by the legislature of a separate discovery-type limitation period
in the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act was "in reality the offspring
of the Illinois Supreme Court['s decision] in Madison."72 This codification
64. 352 I11. at 62, 184 N.E. at 902. Accord, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
65. 352 I1. at 62, 184 N.E. at 902.
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.24 (1937).
67. 49 11. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1961).
69. 49 II1. App. at 338, 199 N.E.2d at 635.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1961).
71. 49 III. App. at 342, 199 N.E.2d at 636.
72. Petersen, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitation: A Right
NOTES AND COMMENTS
would seem to be strong evidence of the legislature's acceptance of Madi-
son's interpretation of section 15. Nevertheless, the appellate court in
Mosby focused on what the legislature did not do in finding a contrary
legislative intent. It reasoned that the legislature, by not enacting a dis-
covery-type approach in section 15 had "by implication" rejected the
discovery rule for this statute of limitation.73 Other courts have recognized
that "[1]egislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean in determining
legislative intent. ''
74
The legislature acted immediately to nullify Mosby. A bifurcated
statute of limitation was enacted in which the plaintiff had two years to bring
suit after discovery of a foreign object negligently left inside him, but in no
event could suit be brought more than ten years after the operation.75
Medical malpractice actions not involving foreign objects still had to be
brought within two years from when the "cause of action accrued."
76
Despite the legislative nullification of Mosby, the appellate courts
adhered strictly to Mosby's legislative prerogative theory.77 They did so
even though it meant having to bar a party's cause of action before he had
become aware of its existence 78 and even though the trend of authority in
other states was in favor of the discovery rule's adoption. 79 For instance, in
Simoniz v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, Inc. 80 the defendants constructed a
building for the plaintiff in 1953 which collapsed in 1962. An examination
of the structure revealed the collapse was caused by defective design,
materials and workmanship. The plaintiff filed suit against the contractor
and the material suppliers. The suit was dismissed because it was not
brought within five years from when the cause of action accrued, 8' which
was held to be when the negligent work was completed.82 The appellate
Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644,649 (1970). The author also points out that one of
the cases on which the Mosby court relied heavily, Leroy v. City of Springfield, 81 111. 114
(1876), was argued in Madison and apparently was rejected by the court. Id. at 649.
73. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the legislative prerogative theory.
74. Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966). See Morgan v. Grace
Hosp., Inc.. 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24
N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). "[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to
find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle." Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 121 (1939).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1965).
76. Id. § 15.
77. Board of Educ. v. Perkins & Will Partnership, 119 111. App. 2d 196, 255 N.E.2d 496
(1970); Wilson v. White Motor Corp., 118 I11. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1969); Sabath v.
Morris Handler Co., 102 III. App. 2d 218, 243 N.E.2d 723 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Joseph J.
Duffy Co., 97 I11. App. 2d 158, 240 N.E.2d 5 (1968); Simoniz Co. v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons,
Inc., 81 111. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
78. See cases cited at note 77 supra.
79. Wilson v. White Motor Corp., 118 I11. App. 2d 436, 439, 254 N.E.2d 277, 279 (1969).
80. 81 111. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1965).
82. 81 Ill. App. 2d at 437, 225 N.E.2d at 166. See note 3 supra.
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court rejected any application of the discovery rule, citing Mosby. It was the
court's opinion that "[m]odifying or changing the applicable time limita-
tions, on the basis of the precedents in this State, must be left to the
legislature. "83
It was in light of the adoption of the legislative prerogative theory at the
appellate level in Illinois that the Illinois Supreme Court considered Rozny
v. Marnul.84 In Rozny, a land surveyor had issued an inaccurate survey of a
certain lot on August 27, 1953. A house was later built on this lot in reliance
upon the survey. In January of 1956, the plaintiff purchased the property. In
September of 1964, he discovered his house and garage encroached on an
adjacent lot. The plaintiff filed suit against the surveyor in 1964, eleven
years after the issuance of the survey.
The Illinois Supreme Court labeled the action as one lying in tort and
held that the applicable statute of limitation was five years from when the
"cause of action accrued. 85 The defendant argued that the cause of action
accrued when the plat was delivered to the builder who ordered it or, at the
latest, at the time the plaintiff relied on the guarantee. Under either construc-
tion the action would have been barred. The court rejected both arguments
holding that the "cause of action accrued," that is, the limitation period
began to run, when plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant's
error. 86 In adopting the discovery rule the court articulated a balancing test
that was to eventually govern the future use of the discovery rule in Illinois:
The basic problem is one of balancing the increase in difficul-
ty of proof which accompanies the passage of time against the
hardship of the plaintiff who neither knows nor should have
known of the existence of his right to sue . . . . [W]here the
passage of time does little to increase the problems of proof, the
ends of justice are served by permitting plaintiff to sue within the
statutory period computed from the time at which he knew or
should have known of the existence of the right to sue.87
The Rozny court felt that the discovery rule was in keeping with more
recent authorities of other jurisdictions and also with the legislative policy
manifested by the Illinois General Assembly.88 The legislative policy re-
ferred to as support for the adoption of the discovery rule was section 24g of
the Limitations Act. 89 This statute had been enacted prior to the court's
83. 81 111. App. 2d at 438, 225 N.E.2d at 166.
84. 43 11. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969). The Rozny case also involved a privity question.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that lack of privity was not per se a bar to the plaintiff's
action. It felt the privity doctrine was archaic and held that "tort liability will henceforth be
measured by the scope of the duty owed ...... Id. at 62, 250 N.E.2d at 660. The privity
doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1961).
86. 43 11. 2d at 72-73, 250 N.E.2d at 665-66.
87. Id. at 70, 250 N.E.2d at 664.
88. Id. at 72-73, 250 N.E.2d at 665-66.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24g (1967).
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opinion and provided for a discovery rule approach in actions against
registered land surveyors for errors in the making of a survey. Rozny's
expressed reliance upon this statute caused its precedential value to be
severely circumscribed by subsequent appellate court decisions.90 The
courts utilized this reliance on legislative policy as a means of distinguishing
Rozny.
In Wilson v. White Motor Co. ,91 the plaintiff had purchased a new
truck from the defendant in April of 1962. The rear suspension system
repeatedly collapsed and each time it was repaired by the seller. In August
of 1967 the plaintiff filed suit for the latest breakdown which had occurred
on June 21, 1966. The appellate court in affirming the trial court's dismissal
of the suit reiterated Mosby's legislative prerogative theory. 92 The appellate
court determined that Rozny was limited in its application to cases within
section 24g of the Limitations Act and, therefore, did not affect the prece-
dential value of Mosby.
In 1970, Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital93 provided the Illinois
Supreme Court with an opportunity to evaluate the merits of Mosby's theory
that the legislature had rejected the discovery rule for all statutes of limita-
tion except those which expressly incorporated the rule. In Lipsey a doctor
and a pathologist in 1963 had negligently diagnosed as benign a lump re-
moved from under a woman's arm. In 1966, a frozen section of this same
lump was reexamined and pronounced malignant. As a result of the three-
year delay, the woman had to undergo radical surgery for the removal of her
left breast, arm and shoulder. She filed suit in 1966 against the doctor and
the pathologist. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the woman's action was time-barred because it was not filed within two
years from when the cause of action accrued.94 The defendants, citing
Mosby, argued that the legislature, by adopting the discovery rule for
foreign object cases, 95 had rejected the rule's application for all other types
of medical malpractice actions. The court's application of the rule, there-
fore, would amount to judicial legislation.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Mosby argument, quoting an
Oregon decision:
The legislature . . . did not provide that the time of accrual was
when the physician performed the negligent act. This court did.
The legislature left the matter undetermined. A determination that
90. Wilson v. White Motor Corp., 118 I11. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1969); Board of
Educ. v. Perkins & Will Partnership, 119 III. App. 2d 196, 255 N.E.2d 496 (1970).
91. 118 I1. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1969).
92. Id. at 439-40, 254 N.E.2d at 279.
93. 46 Ii. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1969).
95. Id. § 22.1.
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the time of accrual is the time of discovery is no more judicial
legislation than a determination that it is the time of the commis-
sion of the act.
9 6
It is important to note precisely what the Illinois Supreme Court held would
trigger the statute of limitation. The plaintiff must have discovered, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, "her
true condition and the defendant's claimed negligence." 97 It is not the mere
96. 46 111. 2d at 39, 262 N.E.2d at 454 (quoting Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 313, 421 P.2d
996, 999 (1966)).
97. This is the language the court used in phrasing the issue. 46 Il. 2d at 37, 262 N.E.2d at
453. Its holding simply said that the limitation period began to run on "discovery of the injury."
Id. at 39, 262 N.E.2d at 455. The court's holding raised a question as to whether discovery of
injury was enough to start the limitation time running without also discovering the causal
connection between the defendant's act(s) and the injury.
Subsequent Illinois cases which have applied the discovery rule have made it clear that
discovery of both factors is required. Wigginton v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 133 I1. App. 2d 776,
274 N.E.2d 118 (1971) ("Granted that the plaintiff in the case before us knew that he was ill, he
nevertheless has alleged that he had no knowledge for some period of time as to the cause of
that illness." Id. at 779, 274 N.E.2d at 120); Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Il. App.
3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973) (discovery of the facts constituting the elements of the cause of
action).
The recent supreme court case of Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc., v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 61111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975), however, has raised a further question.
The court described the discovery rule as the plaintiff's actual or constructive knowledge "of
the existence of his right to sue." Id. at 133, 334 N.E.2d at 162. This implies that discovery of
the injury, the causal connection and the fact such conduct is tortious is required to trigger the
limitations statute. The court may simply have been lax in its discussion of the discovery rule.
See Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). In any event, "[i]t is
unrealistic to require actual or constructive knowledge of 'fault' which is essentially a legal
conclusion that cannot normally be known until trial." J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 273 (1977). The better view is that articulated in Kohler; the statute
begins to run when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the factual basis for an
actionable claim regardless of whether the plaintiff knows he has a "right to sue." Kohler v.
Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 IIl. App. 3d 455, 460, 304 N.E.2d 677, 681 (1973).
Most other states have held that the statute is triggered under the discovery rule when the
plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge that he has been injured and that it was caused
by the conduct of the defendant. See, e.g., Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir.
1977); Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974); Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305
A.2d 219 (1973) (plaintiff need not be informed by counsel that he has a cause of action);
Patterson v. Estate of Flick, 69 Mich. App. 101, 244 N.W.2d 371 (1976). See also the numerous
cases cited in Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163, 1168-72 (6th Cir. 1975) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting). The ABA INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILI-
TY (1976) also favors this position. Id. D app., at 50.
Even under this approach, however, the line is not clear cut. In the situation where an
employee discovers that the cause of his respiratory illness is a company's chemical compound,
this would be sufficient to start the statute running. The employee should be aware of the basis
for a claim. In the situation where a patient is tortiously injured by a doctor, more should be
required than just the discovery of the injury and its causal connection with the acts of the
doctor. Often injury or pain is to be expected. Even if not expected the patient must necessarily
rely on those providing medical care. Therefore, "it is only when (the patient) is acquainted
with the problem that in fact exists," and realizes that his injury was possibly caused by the
doctor's misconduct, that the statute of limitations begins to run. Bridgford v. United States,
550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773, 775 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See Hulver v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Alfone v. Sarno, 139
N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (1976); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962). In Singh v. Carle
Clinic, No. 76L-969 (6th Judicial Circuit, filed July 1977) an Illinois trial court held that "the
NOTES AND COMMENTS
discovery of the injury that starts the statute running but the knowledge,
actual or constructive, that it was caused by the defendant's negligent act or
omission, that is, the discovery of a basis for a claim.
98
A principal question left unanswered by Lipsey was the approach to be
taken in determining the boundaries of the discovery rule's expansion. It
became the task of the appellate courts to determine: (1) whether the
discovery rule could be applied in connection with statutes not containing
"cause of action accrued" language; 99 and (2) whether the discovery rule
holding of Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, 46 III. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) means the
cause of action accrues not when the patient learns or should have learned of her loss of health
or deteriorated physical condition, but when she learns of [or] should have learned of an actual
wrong done to her to bring about her lessened condition." Id. In this regard the experience,
background and medical skills of the patient may be considered. Hayes v. Weyrens, 15 III. App.
3d 365, 367, 304 N.E.2d 502, 503 (1973); Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973).
The interpretation of what constitutes discovery of the "injury" for purposes of applying
the judicial time-of-discovery rule is important in interpreting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1
(Interim Supp. 1976). Section 22.1 provides that any malpractice suit against a physician or
hospital must be brought within two years after plaintiff has actual or constructive "knowledge
of his injury," but in no event may such an action be brought more than four years from the
date on which occurred the act or omission giving rise to the injury. The question raised is what
the legislature meant by "knowledge of the injury." Since the legislature was merely codifying
the judicially created discovery rule (albeit by placing an outside limit on it), knowledge of the
injury under Section 22.1 should be interpreted in the same manner as discovery of the injury
under the judicial time-of-discovery rule.
One Illinois court has held that the discovery rule is not intended to apply where the
plaintiff knows he has a cause of action but is unaware of the identity of the proper party
defendant. Solt v. McDowell, 132 Ill. App. 2d 864, 868, 272 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1971). This parallels
the approach taken with regard to the Illinois fraudulent concealment statute (ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 83, § 23 (1975)). Proctor v. Wells Bros. Co., 181 I11. App. 468 (1913), aff'd, 262 II1. 77, 104
N.E. 186 (1915).
98. See cases cited at note 97 supra. Earlier cases intimated that the plaintiff did not have
the full statutory period from the point of discovery within which to file suit but only a
reasonable period of time. See New Market Poultry Farm v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419,423,241 A.2d
633, 636 (1968); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 442, 173 A.2d 277, 286 (1960); Rothman v.
Silber, 90 N.J. Super. 22, 36, 37-38, 216 A.2d 16, 25, 26 (concurring opinion of Gaulkin, S.J.
App. Div.), cert. denied, 46 N.J. 538, 218 A.2d 405 (1966).
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in E. J. Korvette v. Esko Roofing, 38 II1.
App. 3d 905, 350 N.E.2d 10 (1976), has held that a plaintiff may avail himself of the full
statutory period from the time he discovers or should have discovered the facts constituting the
basis for a claim. Id. at 909, 350 N.E.2d at 13. Compare this to the approach another Illinois
court has taken with regard to the fraudulent concealment statute (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 23
(1975)) in Solt v. McDowell, 132 I11. App. 2d 864, 272 N.E.2d 53 (1971).
New Jersey has adopted a different approach under the discovery rule with regard to
plaintiffs who discover their cause of action within the statutory period computed from the
actionable conduct of the defendant. If the plaintiff files his suit within the statutory period
computed from the point of discovery, the suit is prima facie timely filed. If the defendant can
establish, however, peculiar or unusual prejudice resulting from the lapse of time between the
expiration of the statutory period (computed from the actionable event) and the date suit is
filed, and can also show that the plaintiff had a reasonable period of time to file suit before
expiration of the statutory period (computed from the actionable event), the cause of action
may be dismissed on limitation grounds. Fox v. Passaic Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976).
99. Lipsey's adoption of the discovery rule was based on its redefining the phrase "cause
of action accrued." Closer analysis of Lipsey and the other cases adopting the rule, however,
reveal this is not an adequate justification for its adoption. See note 53 supra. What these
courts have done is not to redefine any particular terms but simply to imply the existence of
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should be automatically applied where a particular limitation statute was
susceptible to a discovery rule interpretation. Rozny had articulated a
possible balancing test approach in deciding whether a plaintiff would be
entitled to invoke the discovery rule. 10 Lipsey, however, made no reference
to it.
The judicial response to being freed from the shackles of Mosby was
not long in coming. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
extended the discovery rule to personal injury negligence actions not within
the medical malpractice sphere. In Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals,
Inc. 01 and McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. 102 the defendant had
negligently sold defective chemical compounds to Sea Sled Industries for a
three-year period, 1963 to 1966. Both plaintiffs were employees of Sea Sled
and were exposed to vapors of isocyanates during the course of their
employment. The plaintiffs alleged the vapors caused injury to their re-
spiratory systems. McDonald and Wigginton became ill in 1963 and both
suits were filed in 1967. The appellate court held that the causes of action
were not barred by the two-year limitation period applicable to personal
injury claims'0 3 and concluded "in factual situations . . .where . . .a
disease existed, the cause of which was not known for a long period of time,
the 'time of discovery rule' should be applied . .. ."104
While the appellate court utilized the discovery rule, it was concerned
with the effect the rule's general use would have on statutes of limitation. Its
statement in this regard, though, is difficult to understand:
[Wie in no way agree with the statement contained in the brief
for the plaintiff that . . . 'it makes no difference what type of an
action for injury to the person is involved. [That] [w]hether it be
caused by malpractice, negligence, a defective product or any
other, the time of accrual is the same.' To subscribe to such a
broad statement would in effect abrogate and nullify the limita-
tions statute. This we do not desire or intend. ....
Lipsey had made clear that all "cause of action accrued" statutes were
susceptible to a discovery rule interpretation.' 0 6 Surely a person who is
injured by any type of negligence and who remains ignorant of the facts
giving rise to his claim is no less deserving of the discovery rule's applica-
tion than were the employees, Wigginton and McDonald. What the appel-
knowledge as a statutory requirement for triggering the running of the statutory period. See
note 55 supra. If viewed in this light, the discovery rule is not limited to cause of action accrued
statutes. See note 15 supra.
100. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
101. 133 Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971).
102. 133 III. App. 2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121 (1971).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1971).
104. 133 Ill. App. 2d at 780, 274 N.E.2d at 121.
105. Id.
106. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
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late court seemed to be questioning was the nullification of the purpose
underlying limitation statutes-the protection of defendants from stale and
nonmeritorious claims-by the automatic application of the discovery rule
in all situations. An automatic application of the rule does "abrogate and
nullify" this interest of the defendants. This problem was to be corrected by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 107
The discovery rule was next extended into the professional malpractice
sphere. In Kohler v. Woolen, Brown & Hawkins,l0 8 two passengers driven
by an uninsured motorist died in an automobile accident in 1962. The
defendants, a co-partnership of attorneys, were retained by the adminis-
trators of the estates to seek recovery for the deaths. The defendants filed a
claim in 1963 with the insurance company that carried uninsured motorist
coverage on the two decedents. The company advised the defendants that it
would not pay the claim. The defendants did not file a demand for arbitra-
tion until 1965. In the arbitration proceeding the defendants procured judg-
ments of $16,000 and $17,500, but these awards were ultimately vacated
because the arbitration demand was not filed within two years from the
death of the decedents as required by the Injuries Act. 1°9 The respective
administrators subsequently filed suit in October 1970 and April 1971
against the defendants for malpractice.
The trial court held for the administrators and the defendants appealed.
The appellate court found that the applicable limitations period was five
years from when the cause of action accrued. 1 0 The defendants argued that
the action was time-barred because the limitations period began to run when
their negligence occurred, that is, May 14, 1964, when the two-year period
for a wrongful death action had expired. The appellate court rejected this
approach and held that the cause of action did not accrue until the adminis-
trators discovered or should have discovered the facts establishing the
elements of their cause of action.1l
107. 61 111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975). See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra.
108. 15 I11. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2(c) (1973).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1971). Much has been written about whether or when a
claim against an attorney sounds in contract for the purposes of selecting the applicable statute
of limitations. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 423 (1954);
Baxter, Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 82 (1969);
Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . . A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (1958);
Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1292-94 (1963).
111. Kohler repudiates Toft v. Acacia Mausoleum Corp., 322 Ill. App. 514,54 N.E.2d 616
(1944), and Maloney v. Graham, 171 I1. App. 409 (1912). Eleven other jurisdictions apply the
discovery rule to attorney malpractice cases. Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa
1975); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974); Berry v. Zisman, 70 Mich.
App. 376, 245 N.W.2d 758 (1976), and Corley v. Logan, 35 Mich. App. 199, 192 N.W.2d 319
(1971); United States Nat'l Bank of Ore. v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 548 P.2d 966 (1976); Woodruff
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It was in light of this expansion of the discovery rule following the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Lipsey that Judge John Paul Stevens,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, considered Gates Rubber Co. v. USM
Corp. 112 In Gates Judge Stevens refused to extend the scope of the dis-
covery rule to a commercial property damage action." 3 A manufacturer had
bought a defective punch press which subsequently, over six years from the
date of sale, caused substantial damage to his plant. After an extensive
analysis of Illinois case law, Judge Stevens reasoned that the Illinois Su-
preme Court had limited the discovery rule to carefully circumscribed
situations involving relationships of expertise or confidence (the profession-
al malpractice cases) and to situations where a defective product caused a
personal injury."l 4 He felt the Illinois Supreme Court did not intend the rule
to have general applicability.
115
One of the cases relied upon by Judge Stevens was the Illinois appellate
court decision in Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. 116 In that case the court refused to apply the discovery rule
to a libel action under section 14 of the Limitations Act. 117 The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, accepted Tom Olesker on appeal and reversed the
appellate court 1 8 in a decision handed down a few months after Judge
Stevens' decision in Gates.
v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1975) (Erie-educated guess); Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d
400, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976); Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va.
1974). The other four jurisdictions apply the discovery rule to all professional malpractice
cases. See note 59 supra. See Comment, Legal Malpractice-Is the Discovery Rule the Final
Solution? 24 HAST. L.J. 795 (1973).
112. 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
113. He did find, however, that a question of fact existed with regard to the plaintiff's
fraudulent concealment claim raised in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 615-16.
114. In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Il1. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), the plaintiff
sought recovery under strict liability for injuries received while operating a trencher manufac-
tured by defendant. The court held that statute of limitations began to run when the injury
occurred and not when the product was sold. While Williams is often referred to as a discovery
rule case, one writer correctly noted that it dealt "with a somewhat different proposition...
namely, the extension of a manufacturer's liability beyond the traditional limits of warranty and
privity of contract." Comment, The Time of Discovery Rule and the Qualified Privilege Defense
for Credit Reporting Agencies in Illinois after World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 10 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 359, 385-86 (1977). In the same regard is Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56
Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). In each of these cases no contractual relationship existed
between the defendant and plaintiff. Thus, regardless of the discovery rule, a cause of action
could not arise until the injury occurred.
115. Accord, Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (no time of
discovery rule in a commercial transaction). For a general discussion of Gates, see Note,
Negligence-Discovery Rule Held Inapplicable in a Commercial Setting (Gates Rubber Co. v.
USM Corp.) (7th Cir. 1975), 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 728 (1975).
116. 16 111. App. 3d 709, 306 N.E.2d 549 (1973), rev'd in part, 61 Ill. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160
(1975).
117. The text of the statute reads: "Actions for slander, libel or for publication of matter
violating the right of privacy, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action
accrued." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1969).
118. 61 111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
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Tom Olesker presented the supreme court with an opportunity to
provide guidance for any further expansion of the discovery rule. In that
case Dun & Bradstreet had published in January 1969 a credit report which
pictured incorrectly the financial state of the plaintiff's business. The plain-
tiff filed suit in March 1970. The defendant contended that the suit was
barred by the one-year statute of limitation for defamation. The court took
notice that such reports are distributed only to subscribers of defendant's
service. Plaintiff was not a subscriber. The court held that the statute of
limitations began to run "at the time [the plaintiff] knew or should have
known of the existence of the allegedly defamatory report. ''119
The supreme court clarified its holding when it stated that the invoca-
tion of the discovery rule was not automatic. Merely because the plaintiff
was free from negligence in failing to prosecute his claim within the
statutory period and merely because the particular limitation statute was
susceptible to a discovery rule interpretation did not mandate the rule be
applied. Instead, a court should utilize the Rozny balancing test' 20 to
determine whether the plaintiff will be allowed to invoke the rule. It should
balance the defendant's interest in being free from stale claims against the
plaintiff's interest in being given an opportunity to present his cause of
action. 121
The Illinois Supreme Court in Tom Olesker took notice of the dis-
covery rule's application in other states to a wide variety of actions.
22
Illinois appellate courts have relied upon the Tom Olesker decision, and in
particular the supreme court's reference to the wide application of the
discovery rule in other states, in rejecting Judge Stevens' decision in
Gates.123 They feel the Illinois Supreme Court has plainly indicated its
intention to give wide application to the time of discovery rule.
119. Id. at 136, 334 N.E.2d at 164.
120. "In deciding whether to apply the discovery rule, this court, in Rozny stated what
considerations . . ." should be weighed. Id. at 133, 334 N.E.2d at 162. See note 87 and
accompanying text supra.
121. This is sometimes referred to as a balancing of the equities. A few other courts have
adopted a similar approach regarding the invocation of the discovery rule. See, e.g., Owens v.
White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965) (applying Idaho law); Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149
Mont. 213, 216-18, 425 P.2d 819, 821 (1967); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274-76, 300 A.2d 563,
566-68 (1973).
Such an approach has been in operation in England for some time. Williams, Limitation
Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881, 885 n.18 (1973). The Limitation
Act, 1963, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, c. 47, provides that a plaintiff may be relieved from the bar of the
statute of limitations upon a showing that "material facts of a decisive character" were not
known until after the running of the statute. The plaintiff must establish that under the
circumstances he could not reasonably have known the facts. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. at 276
n.4, 300 A.2d at 568 n.4.
122. 61 111. 2d at 135-36, 334 N.E.2d at 163-64.
123. See E.J. Korvette v. Esko Roofing, 38 11. App. 3d 905, 350 N.E.2d 10 (1976); Praznik
v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976).
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The latest supreme court case dealing with the discovery rule is Auster
v. Keck. 124 In that case the court put Illinois lawyers on notice that the
discovery rule may not be raised to overcome the defendants' invocation of
the statute of limitations defense unless lack of knowledge is properly
pleaded. In Auster the plaintiffs were second purchasers of a home which
had been designed by the defendant architect in 1960 and built shortly
thereafter. The plaintiffs purchased the home in 1969 and the ceiling soon
began to collapse. In 1972, the plaintiffs filed a malpractice action against
the architect. The architect moved to dismiss based on section 16 of chapter
83125 which provides that any action to recover damages for injury to
property must be filed within five years after the cause of action accrues.'
26
The trial court dismissed the action, holding the limitation statute began to
run when construction was completed. The appellate court reversed, apply-
ing the discovery rule. It held that the statute began to run when the
plaintiffs discovered the architectural malpractice.
127
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated
the trial court's decision. 128 It held that the plaintiffs' failure to properly
plead the discovery rule prevented its application. This decision should be
scrutinized carefully. The supreme court proceeded on the erroneous as-
sumption that the plaintiffs' cause of action was somehow "dependent on
the alleged tort arising from the contractual relationship between the ar-
chitect and the prior owner. "129 This assumption explains the supreme
124. 63 Ill. 2d 485, 349 N.E.2d 20 (1976).
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1973).
126. In 1963 the Illinois legislature had enacted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (1963), which
provided, inter alia, that no action to recover for personal injury, property damage or wrongful
death arising out of a defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to realty could be
brought against those who perform or furnish the design, plan, supervision or construction
"unless such cause of action ... accrued within four years after the performance or furnish-
ing" of design or construction services. In the case of a personal injury suit, the limitation
period would be six years following the performance or furnishing of design or construction
services, four years for the cause of action to accrue under section 24f plus two years within
which to bring suit under section 15 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1963)). In the case of a
property damage claim, the limitation period would be nine years, four years under section 24f
plus five years within which to bring suit under section 16 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1963)).
Section 24f was found unconstitutional because it protected special classes of persons without
extending equal protection to material men and owners of the real estate. Skinner v. Anderson,
38 11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). Five other courts have found similar statutes to be
unconstitutional while twelve have upheld them. See cases cited in Kittson County v. Wells,
Denbrook & Assocs., 241 N.W.2d 799, 801 n.3 (Minn. 1976). For an analysis of the constitu-
tional considerations in these special limitation statutes, see Comment, Limitation of Action
Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Nonaction, 18 CATH. L. REV. 361 (1969).
In October 1969, the legislature enacted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 58 (1969), which
establishes a presumption of reasonable care in design and construction, if the improvement
manifests no defects for a six-year period. This statute has yet to be tested in litigation.
127. 31 Il. App. 3d 61, 333 N.E.2d 65 (1975); accord, Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 31
Ill. App. 3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588 (1975).
128. 63 Ill. 2d 485, 349 N.E.2d 20 (1976).
129. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 43 Ill. App. 3d 765, 772, 357
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court's decision regarding the discovery rule. The plaintiffs had alleged that
they had no knowledge of the defect prior to its appearance. The supreme
court noted, however, that the complaint was fatally silent with respect to
the knowledge or lack thereof that the prior owner had concerning the
existence of the defect. 130 Implicit in this holding is that if the prior owner
had such knowledge the plaintiffs' suit was barred even before they had
purchased the home and had a right, or for that matter any reason, to sue the
architect. 131
One of the most interesting applications of the discovery rule occurred
in Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc. 132 where the rule, for the first time in any
jurisdiction, was applied to a wrongful death action. On March 23, 1969
Mr. and Mrs. Ronald J. Dobbs departed by aircraft for the Bahama Islands.
They travelled in an aircraft owned by Sport Aero, a non-profit flying club
and leased to one of its members. The Dobbs did not return on March 29,
1969 as expected. Without any further information the administrator of the
Dobbs' estates filed suit against Sport Aero on March 29, 1971, basing the
action on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. In November of 1971, two years
and eight months after the crash, the wreckage of the aircraft was dis-
covered.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act 133 which provided that "every action shall be com-
menced within two years after the death of such person." The appellate
court rejected the argument, holding that the statute of limitation did not
begin to run until November 1971 when the wreckage was discovered
because it was at this time that plaintiff first knew with any certitude of the
N.E.2d 621, 626 (1976). Lobianco distinguished Auster on this ground. In Lobianco a home
was built in 1966 and plaintiffs, the homeowners, bought it in 1971. The house was partially
destroyed by fire in 1972. The plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the masonry
contractor. The court held that the plaintiffs' cause of action, charging the masonry contractor
with negligence in the construction of the fireplace, arose at the time of the fire.
130. Even assuming the plaintiffs' action was interrelated with that of the prior owner, such
a requirement as this "appears to be an unprecedented and potentially impossible standard of
proof." Note, Malpractice: The Design Professionals Dilemma, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
287, 306-07 (1977). The plaintiff "must allege and prove lack of knowledge on the part of all
previous owners, some of whom may have moved, dissolved their corporation, merged their
organization or worse of all died. Id.
131. This premise of the Auster decision has been rejected in AETNA LIFE & CAS. CO. v.
SAL E. LOBIANCO & SON Co., 43 III. App. 3d 765, 357 N.E. 2d 621 (1976). See note 129 supra.
132. 42 III. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1%9). It was recently held in Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co.,-
Ill. App. 3d -, 365 N.E.2d 498 (1977), that a wrongful death cause of action of a decedent's
minor child may be brought within the time specified by section 22 of the Limitations Act (ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22 (1975)) notwithstanding the wrongful death statute of limitations (ILL.
REV. STAT ch. 70, § 2 (c) (1975)). The court felt that "the intent of the Legislature to extend the
time to bring an action for persons under 18 years of age, as set forth in section 22 of the
Limitations Act .. .overrides section 2 of Chapter 70." - Ill. App. 3d at -, 365 N.E. 2d at
501.
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decedents' deaths. The evolution of the discovery rule in Illinois caused the
court to determine that the discovery rule was now the general rule' 34 and
that the only question which remains is its application in specific situations.
LEGISLATIVE CODIFICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN ILLINOIS
The initial legislative codification of the discovery rule was a medical
malpractice statute135 in which a plaintiff had two years to bring suit after
discovery of a foreign object negligently left inside him. In no event,
however, could suit be brought more than ten years after the operation.
In 1975 and 1976 the General Assembly completely revamped the
medical malpractice statute of limitation. Following the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Lipsey, the discovery rule applied to all medical mal-
practice actions with only foreign object cases having an outside limit of ten
years. The legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Act 3 6 in 1975 which
included a revision of the statute of limitation. 137 They placed an outside
limit of five years on medical malpractice claims not involving foreign
objects.
In 1976, the General Assembly passed medical malpractice legisla-
tion,' 38 which included another revision of the limitation statute,' 39 whereby
a uniform rule was adopted for all medical malpractice suits brought against
a physician or hospital. Such a suit must be brought within two years after
the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the "injury" but in no
event may such an action be brought more than four years from the date "on
which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged . . . to have been
the cause of such injury . . . . "'40 The legislature rejected a bill which
134. 42 I11. App. 3d at 336, 355 N.E.2d at 691. The discovery rule also seems to have taken a
dominant position with regard to federal limitation statutes. In Hulver v. United States, 393 F.
Supp. 749 (1975), the court stated: "It is well settled that the period of limitations does not begin
to run until the [defendants') alleged acts or omissions . . . are discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by the plaintiff. This equitable doctrine
applies to all federal statutes of limitation .... ." Id. at 754.
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1965).
136. "An Act to revise the law in relation to medical practice." PUB. ACT 79-960, 1975 ILL.
LAWS Vol. II.
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975). The Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional
the Medical Malpractice Review Panel, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-.10 (1975); the
regulation of malpractice insurance rates, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013a (1975); and the
$500,000 limitation of recovery, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975). Wright v. Central DuPage
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 II1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
138. The various sections are contained in "An Act in relation to the regulation of medical
practice and recovery for injuries from malpractice." PUB. ACT 79-1434, 1976 ILL. LAWS.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Interim Supp. 1976).
140. Id. The statute places a limit on the use of the discovery rule only in actions against
physicians and hospitals as opposed to other health care providers. Who exactly is encom-
passed within the term "physician" is open to speculation:
[lI]t is by no means clear that dentists, osteopaths, or chiropractors, all of whom are
licensed to practice in this state, are included within the term 'physician' so as to
receive the benefits of the protection of Sec. 22.1 as would those holding an M.D.
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would have completely eliminated a discovery rule approach for all medical
malpractice actions except foreign object cases. 141
ANALYSIS
Many judiciaries have applied the discovery rule to their tort statutes of
limitation. They recognize that while there is a need to protect prospective
defendants from stale lawsuits, an absolute bar has the adverse effect of
removing a legal remedy for meritorious claims that are not discovered until
after the limitation period has run. Most of these courts have failed to
realize, however, that while the discovery rule achieves a result more
beneficial to the plaintiff in such cases, it has the automatic consequence of
exposing prospective defendants to suit for events which occurred twenty-
five, fifty or even a hundred years previous and for which no evidence now
exists with which the defendant can defend himself.
The Illinois judiciary has recognized that in attempting to achieve
justice for both the plaintiff and the defendant "any attempt to favor one
must be at the expense of the interests of the other."' 42 For this reason the
Illinois Supreme Court, in Tom Olesker, set out the Rozny balancing test as
the proper approach to be used in considering the judicial application of the
discovery rule in a particular case. In light of the particular facts presented,
the judge will balance "the increase in the difficulty of proof which accom-
panies the passage of time against the hardship of the plaintiff who neither
knew nor should have known of the existence of his right to sue." ' 143 In
other words, the courts will balance the policy of protecting parties from
false and fraudulent claims which become increasingly difficult to disprove
degree. Additionally, the court has some doubts whether out-patient clinics would
receive those protections or . . . whether an association or professional corporation
of physicians would receive the protection that the individual physician members
thereof would receive ....
Singh v. Carle Clinic, No. 76L-969 (6th Judicial Circuit, filed July 1977).
It is clear that section 22.1 does not apply to e.g., nurses, anesthetists, lab and X-ray
technicians, occupational and physical therapists, nursing homes, and independent laboratories
providing services to physicians. The statute of limitations applicable to causes of action
against these health care providers is the personal injury statute (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15
(1975)), ("two years after the cause of action accrued"). The discovery rule is applicable to
these defendants without any outside time limit.
In Singh v. Carle Clinic, No. 76L-969 (6th Judicial Circuit, filed July 1977), Trial Judge
Robert E. Steigmann held that section 22.1 is unconstitutional as being special privilege
legislation (Article 4, section 13 of Illinois Constitution of 1970) in favor of hospitals and
physicians. See also Skinner v. Anderson, 38 III. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
141. House Bill 3545, Proposed Amendment 15. The legislature also rejected a proposed re-
extension of the outside limit on foreign object cases to that limit which existed in 1965, ten
years from the date of operation. "An Act in relation to the regulation of medical practice and
recovery for injuries from malpractice." PUB. ACT 79-1434, 1976 ILL. LAWS § 6, at 1352-53.
142. Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881,
885 (1973).
143. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d
129, 133, 334 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1975).
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with passage of time against the policy of insuring that a party with a valid
claim be given an opportunity to present it.
The Illinois legislature has stepped in and placed an outside limit on the
use of the discovery rule in the medical malpractice area. With regard to
those cases that fall within the time period provided, the legislature has also
replaced the judicial balancing test with a hard and fast approach. If the
plaintiff has remained faultlessly ignorant of the facts constituting his claim,
he is automatically entitled to invoke the discovery rule.
The outside limit imposed by the Illinois legislature on the use of the
discovery rule in medical malpractice cases is not unique. Eighteen states
have a discovery statute of limitation for medical malpractice actions.44 The
vast majority of these statutes contain an outside time limit after which suit
may not be brought; the exceptions being Michigan
145 and Vermont 146
which provide no outside limit for any medical malpractice actions, while
Iowa, 147 Tennessee 148 and Utah 149 have no outside limit for foreign object
cases.
The distinguishing factor which has caused the enactment of these
bifurcated statutes of limitation in this area of tort law is the medical
malpractice crisis. 150 The discovery rule subjects a professional to undeter-
mined liability. This "long tail of exposure" (the discovery rule's applica-
tion without any outside time limit) makes it impossible to make actuarial
predictions, that is, a prediction of ultimate exposure to contingent
liabilities. A result is an increase in professional malpractice insurance
costs. 151 An absolute outside limit on the discovery rule will enable insur-
ance companies to restrict their reserves according to a specified time period
and may thereby result in a reduction in the cost of malpractice insurance.' 
5 2
144. See note 58 supra. While the courts have not felt constrained in adopting the dis-
covery rule they feel that the creation of an outside limit on the rule must be left to the
legislature. See Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 26 (1976).
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512(4) (Supp. 1976).
147. IOWA CODE § 614.1(9) (Supp. 1976).
148. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Supp. 1976).
149. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Interim Supp. 1976).
150. The Illinois State Medical Society, Illinois Hospital Association and the insurance
underwriters had introduced the various medical malpractice legislation including the revised
statute of limitations. See ILLINOIS TRIAL LAWYERS Assoc., PETITION TO THE HONORABLE DAN
WALKER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, REQUESTING THE GOVERNOR TO EXERCISE HIS
AMENDATORY VETO POWER AS TO SECTION FOUR OF SENATE BILL 1024 3 (1975). One of their
major complaints was the discovery rule's application without any outside time limit. This made
it impossible for insurance companies to make accurate actuarial predictions.
151. Insurance companies have had to increase their premiums in order to reflect the lack
of predictability of the costs underlying malpractice insurance claims. ILLINOIS INSURANCE
COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 47-60 (June 1975).
152. Note, A Four Year Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plain-
tiff's Case be Barred? 2 PAC. L.J. 663,668-69 (1971). See Henahan, Malpractice, 237 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 11 (1976).
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The bifurcated statute is a severe measure adopted to combat this serious
insurance problem. 1
53
Most commercial and professional entities carry liability insurance and
the cost of their insurance will also increase because the discovery rule
prevents accurate actuarial predictions on behalf of the insurer. Such an
increase, however, would have to be severe to justify a similar limitation on
the scope of the discovery rule as now exists in the medical malpractice
arena. This is especially true in light of the fact that the customers of any
commercial or professional entity ultimately bear the cost of such insurance.
The public may be more willing to bear the increased cost in malpractice
insurance rather than to have an absolute time bar imposed against undis-
covered meritorious claims against the company or professional.
The bifurcated statute should not be adopted in other tort areas because
it does not achieve a proper balance between the competing interests of the
plaintiff and defendant. The bifurcated statute does reduce the probability of
injustice which results when a party has a meritorious claim barred before he
even becomes aware of the facts constituting the claim. It does not, how-
ever, eliminate the possibility of such an injustice ever occurring, as does
the judicial balancing test. The justification put forth for the bifurcated
statute is that society has a need for certainty and finality in the administra-
tion of affairs. "[T]he Illinois legislature concluded that, after an adequate
time interval has passed, the separate interest in finality outweighs the
interest of affording every plaintiff a remedy for his wrong."154
The purpose of the statutes of limitation, however, is not to shield a
wrongdoer, 155 and they are not intended to provide eventual peace of mind to
a tortfeasor regarding potential liability. 156 The primary purpose of limita-
tion periods is to "prevent a plaintiff from gaining an unfair advantage by
carelessly and wilfully sleeping on his rights. . . . "157 It is difficult to
153. "Special considerations in medical malpractice indicate that legislative limitation in
other areas is not immediately anticipated." Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Dis-
covery and the Statute of Limitations, 64 ILL. B.J. 326, 332 (1976). See James & Thorton, The
Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950). See
generally, G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
154. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1975). The statute of
limitations of the Uniform Commercial Code states that "[a]n action for breach of any contract
for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued," and that
the "cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725(1), (2) (1975). Comment 2 to this
code provision states that the rule is "based on a policy 'that commercial interests are best
served by quickly bringing finality to commercial transactions.' " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-
725 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
155. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d
129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975).
156. Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555, 560 (R.I. 1976).
157. Id. at 560. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
61 111. 2d at 132, 334 N.E.2d at 162.
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understand how any interest in finality can outweigh the policy of providing
every plaintiff a remedy for his wrong. This is especially difficult to
comprehend in light of the judicial balancing test now being used by the
Illinois courts with respect to the discovery rule-a test which achieves a
proper balance between the competing interests of the plaintiff and defend-
ant. The absolute time bar of the bifurcated statute prevents the court from
ascertaining whether a plaintiff has in fact slept on his rights and whether
there has been any increase in the difficulty of proof as a result of the
passage of time. It creates an unfounded presumption that any claim left
unattended for a specified period results in such a destruction and disappear-
ance of relevant evidence as to warrant taking away the legal remedy of a
meritorious claimant.
CONCLUSION
The discovery rule is in a process of judicial and legislative evolution in
practically every jurisdiction. The harshness and sometimes flagrant injus-
tice caused by the traditional rule that a cause of action accrued when the
tortious act occurred, regardless of the wronged party's lack of knowledge
of the tortfeasor's negligence, cried out for an alternative approach, a
modification. Where the legislature has been unwilling to act, the courts
have stepped in and adopted the discovery rule, leaving to the legislature the
question of whether the reform should be retained or rescinded in whole or
in part.
The discovery rule is now the general rule in Illinois and it will be
applied in appropriate circumstances. The Illinois courts have seen the folly,
however, in abandoning one extreme position (an absolute time bar for the
protection of a prospective defendant from stale claims) for another (strict
application of the discovery rule as a means of preserving a plaintiff's
meritorious cause of action). Instead the Illinois courts apply a judicial
balancing test which is both workable and flexible.
The intriguing questions which remain are: (1) whether the discovery
rule will come to dominate in other states, as it has in Illinois, all areas of
tort law; and (2) whether state legislatures will confine the discovery rule's
activity to arbitrarily defined time periods by the use of the bifurcated
statute. As a result, most tort statutes of limitation, which had remained
virtually unchanged since the era of King James I, will be in a state of
transformation for years to come.
WILLIAM G. CRIMMINS
